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ARTICLES
BEYOND THE FOUR CORNERS
OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT:
A GLOBAL CHALLENGE TO
U.S. CONTRACT LAW
Chunlin Leonhard1
“. . . [A] great deal of American contract law and scholarship
now seems to proceed from a perspective of universalism.  Ameri-
can universalism assumes, often tacitly, that domestic theories
in contemporary American debate are valid not only across the
world, but throughout time.  In other words, the assumption is
made that such theories are valid transculturally and objectively
true.”2
1 This article has benefited tremendously from discussions at the April 27,
2007 Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty held at William Mitchell
School of Law, including, without limitation, discussions with Professors Ilhyung
Lee of University of Missouri and Nancy S. Kim of California Western School of
Law.  I am grateful to the faculty of Loyola University School of Law in Chicago for
their support and encouragement.  In particular, I want to thank Loyola Univer-
sity Professors Michael Kaufman, Cynthia Ho, Margaret Moses, Gregory Shaffer,
and Spencer Waller for commenting on the earlier drafts of this paper.  I am also
grateful to Janice Collins, a law librarian at Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal,
LLP, for her generous research assistance.  All mistakes are mine.
2 Brooke Overby, Contract in the Age of Sustainable Consumption, 27 J.
CORP. L. 603, 605 (2002).
1
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2 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:1
“We should not only tolerate cultural differences (between
ethnic groups, countries or religions), we should, in fact, wel-
come them.”3
INTRODUCTION
U.S. contract law has developed on the basis of certain es-
sential assumptions such as freedom of contract, autonomy and
liberal individualism.4  A simplified summary of the basic as-
sumptions underlying U.S. contract law is that rational and
well informed parties will drive a hard bargain on their own
behalf for their own best interests and the resulting agreement
reflects the free will of the parties.5  Because of those basic as-
sumptions, U.S. contract law primarily concerns itself with only
protecting the resulting bargain reached by the parties.6  Rely-
ing on a set of well entrenched contract interpretation and con-
struction principles, U.S. courts will generally refuse to look
beyond the four corners of the written contract.7  U.S. contract
law essentially casts a magic shield around the written contract
as a true embodiment of the parties’ intent.8  Hence, in a U.S.
3 The Power of Culture, A Commitment to Pluralism: Introduction, http://
www.powerofculture.nl/uk/archive/report/chapter2_intro.html (last visited Feb.
24, 2009).  By quoting this statement, I do not mean to suggest that all cultural
values or differences are worth preserving or should be respected.  However, it is
fair to say that some cultural values may be worth preserving.  This is certainly a
very controversial topic.  I simply mean to include cultural differences which have
a positive impact on human life, leaving aside all the philosophical inquiries one
can engage on that topic.
4 R. Korobkin & T.S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ra-
tionality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1061-69
(2000); Julian S. Lim, Tongue-Tied in the Market:  The Relevance of Contract Law
to Racial-Language Minorities, 91 CAL. L. REV. 579, 590 (2003); Melvin A. Eisen-
berg, Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 808
(2000); Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in Discussion of
Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889, 897 (1997).
5 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1061-69; Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s
Modification of Contract:  An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Refor-
mation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 329 (1999).
6 Lim, supra note 4, at 590-91.
7 Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and Interpretation
Rules: The Need for a Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB. L. REV.
506, 508-09 (2005); see also Philip J. McConnaughay, Rethinking the Role of Law
and Contracts in East-West Commercial Relationships, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 427
(2001).
8 As pointed out by many scholars, U.S. contract law has made some progress
and evolved away from its rigid classical paradigm, to allow equitable considera-
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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2009] A GLOBAL CHALLENGE TO U.S. CONTRACT LAW 3
court, a party is entitled to “enforce terms [of a written contract]
to the letter.”9
U.S. contract law’s underlying assumptions reflect the core
values of the Anglo-American traditions of the dominant west-
ern culture in the United States.10  They do not “travel well”11
across cultures with drastically different traditions.  In this age
of globalization,12 different cultures are interacting with each
other economically and otherwise in unprecedented ways.  The
recent world financial market turmoil related to the subprime
mortgage loan problems, which originated in the United States,
is merely another reminder of how interdependent many coun-
tries have become.
This article uses the Chinese culture as an example to
demonstrate the need for U.S. contract law to adapt to a global
environment.13  This paper describes the cultural differences
that impact contracting behavior in the commercial business
context in cross border transactions between the United States
tions in certain limited situations.  As discussed later in this paper, the limited
progress is insufficient to remedy the inequities present in a cross cultural busi-
ness to business context with which this paper is concerned. See discussion infra
Part III.
9 Cromeens, Holloman, Siber, Inc. v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 395-96 (7th Cir.
2004).
10 Kim, supra note 7, at 531-32.
11 William Twining, Have Concepts, Will Travel: Analytical Jurisprudence in
a Global Context, 1 INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT 5 (2005).  I am borrowing this “traveling”
concept from Professor William Twining, Quain Professor of Jurisprudence Emeri-
tus, University College London.  Professor Twining discussed concepts that “travel
relatively well or badly” in his article.  I use the phrase “traveling well” in this
context to mean not only applicable, but also applicable equitably and efficiently.
Id.
12 A review of the globalization debate shows that the word “globalization”
has become a term of art.  Its definition varies depending on who is talking.  In this
article, I am using the word “globalization” neutrally to describe the reality of a
shrinking globe as a result of the advent of high speed internet and other technolo-
gies and the ease of moving around globally both digitally and physically.
13 This paper focuses on the cultural differences between China and the U.S.
because of the importance and increasing volume of China’s trade with the U.S.
Business contacts between China and the United States have increased dramati-
cally over the last two decades and will continue to do so. China has experienced
spectacular growth of foreign trade.  Mitchell Silk & Richard Malish, Are Chinese
Companies Taking Over the World?, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 105, 106-07 (2006). The
problems raised by this paper also face peoples from other countries and regions
and among immigrant residents and citizens of the United States.  Kim, supra
note 7, at 532-36; see generally Lim, supra note 4 (examining this issue primarily
from the language/race perspective).
3
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4 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:1
and China.  Extensive scholarly research has demonstrated
that the Chinese do not share the same cultural values as
Americans14 and they have different understandings regarding
the significance of written contracts.  As a result, written agree-
ments between U.S. and Chinese parties do not often reflect the
true intent of the parties.  Therefore, interpreting written con-
tracts through the colored lenses of U.S. contract law and en-
forcing those written contracts in total disregard of the parties’
cultural differences may be unfairly detrimental to a party from
a drastically different culture.
The following example illustrates the serious consequences
of culturally induced misunderstandings on a Chinese company
when it enters into a contractual relationship with a U.S. com-
pany.  Driven by fierce global competition, a multinational U.S.
company went to China to find a partner to manufacture and
design consumer electronics products (“widgets”) under the U.S.
company’s brand.  The U.S. company wanted to avoid the initial
extensive capital investment for the manufacturing and to take
advantage of the low design costs in Asia.  It chose a successful
Chinese electronics widgets manufacturer which had a demon-
strated design capacity.  During the numerous meetings over
the telephone and face to face, the U.S. company’s representa-
tives orally promised to be a long term business partner.  It
promised the Chinese company that the relationship would
start with contract manufacturing as the first phase.  Eventu-
ally, the U.S. company would also use the Chinese company to
design the widgets for the U.S. company.  The U.S. company
also asked the Chinese company to manufacture the widgets ex-
clusively for the U.S. company.  In return for the Chinese com-
pany’s exclusivity commitment, the U.S. company’s
representatives orally promised that it would purchase large
quantities of the widgets over the long term from the Chinese
company and eventually, it would buy widgets designed by the
Chinese company.
14 The United States today has become a very pluralistic society.  By using the
phrase “American culture,” I do not mean to ignore the cultural diversity in this
country.  For the sake of brevity, however, the term “American culture” as used in
this article refers to dominant culture which derives from the Anglo-Saxon
tradition.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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2009] A GLOBAL CHALLENGE TO U.S. CONTRACT LAW 5
The U.S. company presented the Chinese company with a
40 page, single spaced agreement in English drafted by the U.S.
company’s attorneys.  The agreement stated that the Chinese
company agreed to manufacture widgets exclusively for the
U.S. company.  The agreement specified that the contract term
was three years and the U.S. company could terminate for any
reason by providing six months notice.  The agreement set forth
the minimum quantity of widgets the U.S. company would
purchase from the Chinese company.  The agreement did not
contain any terms about the design phase of the relationship.  It
contained a standard merger clause.  In addition, the agree-
ment stated that the parties were not partners and the relation-
ship did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship between the
parties.  The agreement chose a U.S. state law as the governing
law.
In their negotiation sessions the Chinese company pointed
out that the terms as set forth in the agreement were not what
they had orally agreed upon.  The U.S. company’s representa-
tives told the Chinese company not to worry about those terms.
They said that the agreement was required by their legal de-
partment and that it would be put away and promptly forgot-
ten.  Despite these inconsistencies, the Chinese company
essentially signed the agreement as drafted by the U.S.
company.
The Chinese company then substantially expanded its
manufacturing capacity to comply with its understanding of the
agreement with the U.S. company.  It hired and trained
thousands of employees and engineers to prepare for the manu-
facturing and the design of the widgets.  Soon after the relation-
ship began, the parties began having disputes.  Barely two
years after the relationship began, the U.S. company termi-
nated the agreement by providing the contractually required six
months notice.  The Chinese company protested vehemently,
but to no avail.  After struggling for a few more years, the Chi-
nese company went out of business.  The Chinese company was
financially healthy at the beginning of the relationship.  It em-
ployed over 10,000 employees at its height.  The Chinese com-
pany’s downfall was due to the financial difficulties caused to a
large extent by its extensive capital and human resources in-
vestment in the manufacturing facility for the U.S. company.
5
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6 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:1
The Chinese company had hoped to recoup its initial invest-
ment through the promised long term partnership.
This paper explores the impact of cultural differences on
Chinese contracting behavior.  It argues that globalization has
presented a new set of challenges that U.S. contract law should
address.  It proposes that, in light of the globalization phenome-
non, the reverence afforded to written contracts by U.S. con-
tract law may not be justified in cross-cultural context.15  Part I
briefly discusses the major cultural, social and legal differences
between China and United States and how those differences im-
pact contracting behavior.  Part II briefly discusses selected ex-
amples of major U.S. contract law doctrines and how their
application to cross cultural contracts unfairly favors U.S. com-
panies, typically the party with more bargaining power.  Part
III discusses certain existing contract doctrines which allow for
equitable considerations in limited context and why they are in-
sufficient to address the inequities in cross cultural business-to-
business contracts.
Part IV sets forth some arguments in support of a need for
the United States to adapt its domestic contract law in light of
the globalization phenomenon.  Part V briefly summarizes cur-
rent academic discussions and proposals to accommodate cul-
tural differences in contract law.  Finally, as an attempt to
generate continuing academic debate on this issue, Part V pro-
poses a culturally differentiated approach to acknowledge the
impact of cultural differences on contracting behavior.  This ap-
proach calls for U.S. courts to permit introduction of cultural
evidence as a threshold requirement, akin to a cultural defense
in the criminal law context as an initial step.  Once a party sus-
tains the burden, the traditional contract doctrines of construc-
tion and interpretation such as the parol evidence rule would
not apply and the party would be allowed to introduce all rele-
vant evidence to prove the terms of its contract, as the parties
truly intended.
15 This paper does not challenge the fundamental notion that promises should
be kept, a belief shared by both Chinese and western cultures.  Rather, it chal-
lenges the U.S. contract law doctrines used to ascertain what promises were made
and should be enforced.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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PART I. MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE
UNITED STATES AND WHY THEY MAKE A DIFFERENCE
WITH REGARD TO CONTRACTS
This section briefly reviews the major cultural and legal dif-
ferences between China and the United States that are relevant
to Chinese attitudes toward contracts.  The Chinese culture has
been developed over thousands of years.  It has been primarily
shaped by two major philosophers: Confucius and Lao Tzu.16  In
addition, the Chinese communism ideology has strongly influ-
enced the modern mainland Chinese thinking.17
Chinese contract law also has some major philosophical dif-
ferences from U.S. contract law.  The Chinese legal system is
very different from the U.S. legal system.  All of these differ-
ences combined create a context for Chinese contracting behav-
ior that is significantly different from the context assumed by
U.S. contract law.
Chinese Culture is Substantially Different from the Anglo
American Culture.
Extensive research shows that Chinese and American cul-
tural values are different.  Researchers have classified Ameri-
can Anglo-saxon oriented culture “as a low-context culture and
the Chinese as a high-context culture.”18  A high context culture
places strong emphasis on social context and traditional val-
ues.19  The American culture is highly individualistic while the
Chinese culture is collectivistic.20  The American and the Chi-
nese cultures practically lie at opposite ends of the individual-
ism/collectivism spectrum.21  The Chinese focus on
“maintaining long-term, harmonious personal relationships”
while the Americans are more interested in “information, objec-
16 Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains Are High and the Em-
peror Is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 477 (2003).
17 John H. Matheson, Convergence, Culture and Contract Law in China, 15
MINN. J. INT’L L. 329, 373 (2006).
18 Kam-hon Lee et al., Tension and Trust in International Business Negotia-
tions:  American Executives Negotiating with Chinese Executives, 37 J. INT’L BUS.
STUD. 623, 624 (2006).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
7
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8 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:1
tivity, and competitiveness.”22  The Chinese culture therefore
does not share the Anglo-American values of individuality, au-
tonomy, freedom of association and equality among market par-
ticipants, values upon which U.S. contract law principles are
primarily based.23
Confucius (551-479 B.C.E) “has the greatest impact on Chi-
nese culture and business today.”24  He has influenced the Chi-
nese society since the second century, when his philosophy
became the official state philosophy.25  Confucius’ goals were to
implement peace, order and stability into society.  Confucius
emphasized social harmony rather than justice.26  “He pro-
moted a philosophy of virtue, ethics, emphasizing . . . duty, loy-
alty, honor, filial piety, kindness, sincerity, and respect for age
and seniority.”27  These virtues established a complicated moral
code which resulted in an autocratic and hierarchical social
structure.28  Moreover, the Confucian tradition created a society
where each person’s role is relative and comparative to an-
other’s role.29  “When all people remain within their established
roles . . . the rule of man is sufficient.”30  The Confucius tradi-
tion thus has taught the Chinese that the rule of law becomes
necessary only when individuals deviate from their roles.31
This rigid social hierarchy results in the basic notion that
relationships are the foundation of a Chinese society.32  Rela-
tionships connect individuals, family groups, and friends to
22 Id.
23 Robert M. LaKritz, Comment, Taming a 5,000 Year-Old Dragon: Toward a
Theory of Legal Development in Post Mao China, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 237, 265-
66 (1997).
24 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 478; see also Joseph W. Dellapenna,
The Role of Legal Rhetoric in the Failure of Democratic Change in China, 2 BUFF.
J. INT’L. L. 231, 235-37 (1996).
25 Hayden Windrow, Transitions in Chinese Law: A Short History of Law,
Norms and Social Control in Imperial China, 7 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 244, 270
(2006); Ni Zhu, A Case Study of Legal Transplant: The Possibility of Efficient
Breach in China, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1145, 1153 (2005); Albert H.Y. Chen, Toward
a Legal Enlightenment: Discussions in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17
UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 125, 129-30 (1999/2000).
26 Id. at 130.
27 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 478.
28 Id.
29 Chen, supra note 25, at 130; Zhu, supra note 25, at 1160.
30 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 478.
31 Id. at 479; see Windrow, supra note 25, at 254.
32 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 479.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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2009] A GLOBAL CHALLENGE TO U.S. CONTRACT LAW 9
each other.33  The group is more important than individuals.34
Through these roles, this system internalizes the social code,
creating a self-regulating society.35
Lao Tzu, another Chinese philosopher, also had a profound
influence on Chinese culture.36  Lao Tzu’s philosophy (Taoism)
provides that the need for law arises when disorder develops
when one has lost the way, integrity, humaneness, righteous-
ness and etiquette.37  Therefore, both Confucianism and Taoism
view law negatively.38
The mid-twentieth century saw China adopt the ideology of
Karl Marx and communism.  Ironically, despite its proclaimed
rejection of everything which represents China’s feudalistic tra-
ditions, the Chinese Communist Party continues the Confucian
focus on the community.39  Communism focuses on promoting
the collective good.40  When the Chinese Communist Party took
over control of the country in 1949, it abolished private property
ownership.41  As a result of Communism and the influence of
the above philosophies, the Chinese continue to focus on group
actions and roles rather than on individual achievement or per-
sonal ownership.42
Legal Differences between China and the United States.
The Chinese legal system and its contract law approach in
particular are also different from those in the United States.
These differences in the Chinese contract law approach and its
legal system have also affected Chinese contracting behavior.
33 Id.
34 Yujie Gu, Entering the Chinese Legal Market:  A Guide for American Law-
yers Interested in Practicing Law in China, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 173, 179 (1999).
35 Zhu, supra note 25, at 1151-52.
36 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 479-82.
37 Id. at 481.
38 Id.
39 Matheson, supra note 17, at 373.
40 Robert Bejesky, The Evolution and International Convergence of the Doc-
trine of Specific Performance in Three Types of States, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 353, 380 (2003).
41 MO ZHANG, CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43 (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 2006) [hereinafter “CHINESE CONTRACT LAW”].
42 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 486.
9
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10 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:1
China has a civil law system and its judicial decisions do
not have precedential value.43  The Chinese Communist Party
currently controls all aspects of China.44  There is no separation
of the judicial, legislative or executive powers.45
Historically, China did not have a well developed commer-
cial law system due to its cultural bias against law.  For a few
thousand years, China was mostly ruled by one man, the Em-
peror, who had the “heavenly mandate.”46  China’s traditional
focus on agriculture and the restrictions on the development of
commercial activities hindered the development of private law
concepts and civil law tradition.47  Throughout its history,
China developed little or no civil law; Chinese law was prima-
rily administrative and penal.48  Although ancient Chinese law
recognized private contracts, application of law to contract dis-
putes was influenced by Confucian ethics and contract disputes
were often resolved in accordance with ethical considerations at
the expense of legal principles.49  The Chinese resolved their
disputes through compromise and community functionalism.50
Because of Chinese cultural “emphasis on social harmony and
the fulfillment of moral obligations,” Chinese culture “discour-
aged civil suits to pursue individuals’ private monetary or pro-
prietary interests.”51  Chinese consider reliance on the written
law as evidence that the individuals had failed to resolve a dis-
pute honorably.52
In 1911, the last Chinese dynasty, the Qing Dynasty, was
overthrown.  The Chinese Nationalist Party established the Re-
public of China (“ROC”).  The Chinese Nationalist government
43 Matheson, supra note 17, at 376.  In his article, Culture and Contract Law,
Professor Matheson provided a detailed discussion on the evolution of Chinese con-
tract law.
44 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 70 (Thomson West 2003).
45 See id. at 68-69.
46 Gu, supra note 34, at 179; CHOW, supra note 44, at 43-44.
47 BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 8-9 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia 2002).
48 See id.; see also Wanhong Zhang, The Orphan of China: Law and Literature
in Contemporary China, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2497, 2499 (2005).
49 See generally id.
50 LaKritz, supra note 23, at 244; Gu, supra note 34, at 179-80.
51 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 506.
52 Neil Boyden Tanner, Note and Comment, The Yin and Yang of Foreign Eco-
nomic Contract Law in the People’s Republic of China - A Legalistic and Realistic
Perspective, 16 J.L. & COM. 155, 165 (1996); McConnaughay, supra note 7, at 442.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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instituted a “civil law system modeled after . . . European
codes.”53  However, the Communist Revolution in 1949 dramati-
cally changed whatever rule of law that had previously existed
in China and the “Communist Party [abolished] the ROC Civil
Code . . . together with all other Nationalist laws.”54  The law
became an instrument of politics.55  The Communist Party had
absolute control over the creation of law and ruled more by de-
cree than by law.  The Communist Party frequently used shame
as punishment for disrupting the good working order of society;
obligations owed to family, friends and other relationships in
the collective social order are given higher priority than individ-
ualistic notions of rights.56
During that time, Chinese contract law development came
to a standstill.  When the Communist Party eliminated private
property ownership, there was no need for contract law because
the government owned all of the property.57  Private individuals
could not engage in any independent economic activities.58  The
concept of “contracts” was imported from the Soviet Union and
used to guide industrialization in China.59  All “contracts” es-
tablished were output quotas and input orders according to the
state plan.60  They were “made and executed according to the
state plan” to facilitate the exchange of commodities among the
various governmental units.61
The Cultural Revolution which began in 1966 interrupted
any economic development of the country as well.62  The Cul-
tural Revolution practically shut down all the law schools in the
country.  The number of lawyers in China shrunk dramatically.
Whatever resemblance of a legal system which had previously
existed was decimated during that time.63  The Cultural
Revolution ended in 1976.
53 LING, supra note 47, at 10.
54 Id. at 11.
55 See CHOW, supra note 44, at 70.
56 Bejesky, supra note 40, at 382.
57 CHINESE CONTRACT LAW, supra note 41, at 43.
58 Id. at 7.
59 LaKritz, supra note 23, at 255.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 LING, supra note 47, at 11.
63 Id.
11
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Chinese contract law which exists today began its develop-
ment in the late 1970s in connection with the Chinese govern-
ment’s desire to develop a more decentralized, market-oriented
economy.64  After the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, China
began opening up to the outside world.  In the 1980s, China
sought to establish a modern legal system as China moved from
a planned economy into a more market-oriented economy.65
China enacted a series of contract laws in a significant move
towards a “more decentralized, market-oriented, and incentive-
based economy.”66
In 1999, China enacted the Contract Law of the People’s
Republic of China in an attempt to harmonize its previous con-
tract laws and regulations (“Contract Law”).  For the first time
in Communist China’s history, private individuals had the right
to enter into general contracts on their own behalf.67  Despite
its adoption of certain familiar western terms such as “freedom
of contract,” the Contract Law has some substantive differences
from U.S. contract law.  For example, the Contract Law appears
very paternalistic in nature.  The Contract Law requires that a
legal contract “may not disrupt social-economic order nor im-
pair social or public interests.”68  Contracting “conduct that vio-
lates social morals and public order [may] include those that
damage national interest . . . restrict economic or business ac-
tivities, violate fair competition [or] . . .  infringe [upon] con-
sumer interests.”69  This reflects the Chinese legislature’s
notion of what is good for the parties regardless of the parties’
desire.  This approach is fundamentally different from U.S. con-
tract law’s laissez faire approach.70
64 CHINESE CONTRACT LAW, supra note 41, at 43-44;  Feng Chen, The New Era
of Chinese Contract Law: History, Development and a Comparative Analysis, 27
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 153, 155-57 (2001) [hereinafter Feng].
65 See Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 499-500; see also Fang Shen, Are
You Prepared for This Legal Maze, How to Serve Legal Documents, Obtain Evi-
dence, and Enforce Judgments in China, 72 UMKC L. REV. 215, 217 (2003).
66 Feng, supra note 64, at 155.
67 CHINESE CONTRACT LAW, supra note 41, at 52-53. Private individuals in
China were permitted for the first time to make technology contracts under the
Technology Contract Law adopted by China in 1987. Id. at 8.
68 Id. at 80.
69 Id. at 82-83.
70 It is beyond the scope of this paper to make a comprehensive comparison of
the major differences between U.S. and China contract law principles.  Professors
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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In addition to the differences in substantive laws, China’s
legal system suffers from other serious problems.71  The con-
tract laws and regulations suffer from lack of transparency, con-
tradictions, redundancies and other problems.72  There is a
grave shortage of well trained legal professionals.73  “It is esti-
mated that [China has] fewer than 200,000 lawyers now, with
plans to increase the number to 300,000 by 2010.”74  China’s le-
gal development also suffers from a lack of active legal aca-
demic debates.  During the Cultural Revolution, there was no
active legal academic scholarship.  It would have been politi-
cally hazardous to express an opinion contrary to the official
Communist Party position.  The shutting down of practically all
of the law schools during the Cultural Revolution also inter-
rupted the training of qualified legal professionals.
Chinese lawyers also play a significantly different role from
those in U.S. society.  Chinese lawyers lack political indepen-
dence.75  They are obligated to be loyal to the cause of the Chi-
nese Communist Party.  The attorney-client relationship, as the
American legal system contemplates, does not exist in China.
On the whole, Chinese lawyers have not played any significant
role in business contexts, unlike their counterparts in the
United States.
In addition, Chinese judges are not well trained.76  Many of
them are retired military officials.  The judges lack judicial in-
dependence and depend on the “local government . . . for their
wages, promotions and bonuses.”77  Because of cultural influ-
ences and Chinese legal traditions, many Chinese judges focus
on preserving the relationship between the parties, as opposed
Matheson, Pattison and Herron provided a more in depth analyses of the two con-
tract law approaches. See supra notes 16 & 17.
71 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 505-08; Matheson, supra note 17, at
375-81.
72 Shen, supra note 65, at 217-18; Matheson, supra note 17, at 379-80. Part of
the reasons why Chinese law is plagued with problems could be attributable to the
fact that in its haste to establish a legal system to foster its unprecedented eco-
nomic growth, China transplanted a lot of western legal concepts.  Zhu, supra note
25, at 1168.
73 Shen, supra note 65, at 217.
74 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 507.
75 Shen, supra note 65, at 238.
76 Id. at 217; Zhang, supra note 48, at 2503.
77 LaKritz, supra note 23, at 262.
13
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to enforcing contracts pursuant to the “letter of the law.”78  Fi-
nally, even if a judgment is rendered, the disputing parties are
often unable “to execute judgments rendered by judicial
bodies.”79
In sum, China has had less than three decades to develop a
legal system geared towards a free market economy in an envi-
ronment with inherent tensions between the political ideology
and free market economy.80  China’s vast size and the conflicts
between the central and local governments also present some
special challenges.  These factors result in an unstable legal en-
vironment plagued with problems.
As a result of the problems with the Chinese legal system
and its negative cultural view toward the rule of law, the Chi-
nese do not count on the law to resolve their disputes.  “In civil
and economic cases, less than one fourth of the litigants are rep-
resented by legal counsel and fewer than four percent of busi-
nesses in China have regular legal advisors.”81  Therefore, it is
not at all surprising that Chinese companies typically do not
have any lawyers, let alone U.S. trained lawyers, advising them
on legal issues.
In contrast, the United States follows a common law system
which is derived from a long line of British common law tradi-
tions.  Although the United States has had its own struggles, its
legal system has developed uninterrupted.  The United States
has a relatively well functioning legal system despite its share
of problems.  There is also a long tradition of legal scholarship
with active academic debates.  The United States also boasts
close to one million employed lawyers and judges, even though
its population is one fourth of China’s.82
78 See LING, supra note 47, at 9; see also Zhu, supra note 25, at 1163-64.
79 LaKritz, supra note 23, at 262; see Zhu, supra note 25, at 1163.
80 See Chen, supra note 25, at 162-63.
81 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 507.
82 The U.S. Census Bureau notes that the U.S. population as of 2008 is ap-
proximately 303 million. United States IDB Country Summary, U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU, available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country/usportal.html.
China’s population stands currently at 1.3 billion. China IDB Country Summary,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at  http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country/ch
portal.html.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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The Impact of Chinese Differences on Contracting Behavior.
As a result of its legal, cultural and political traditions, the
foundations of the rules of Chinese society are relationships,
reciprocity and respect (not the commonly understood American
notions of law).83  As discussed in the previous section, the most
fundamental difference between the Chinese and Western cul-
tures is the role an individual plays in society.  The Chinese
identity is “not formed based on a concept of self,” unlike the
Western identity which is focused on the individual.84
The Chinese cultural attitude influences Chinese con-
tracting behavior in multiple ways.  When a Chinese citizen en-
gages in an economic relationship with another party, profit
and self interest may not be the paramount goals.  These goals
may be “subordinated to a larger group-based or common good”
goal.85  Because of the focus on collective good, a Chinese man-
ager will retain “[u]nproductive employees . . . and unprofitable
companies may continue to exist.”86  Chinese philosophies en-
courage individuals to subordinate themselves to the good of the
family and society in order to achieve balance and harmony.
This is directly contrary to the U.S. contract law’s assumption
that parties to a contract will negotiate at arms’ length and
drive a hard bargain on behalf of their own best interests.87
Because of their cultural focus on relationships, the Chi-
nese are more sensitive to the relationship aspect of negotia-
tions.88  The Chinese tend to establish contractual relationships
based on trust and honor without any reliance on the enforce-
ment powers of law.  “A contract is considered unnecessary,
sometimes offensive, when rules of loyalty and mutual obliga-
83 Chen, supra note 25, at 130.
84 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 479, 486.
85 Id. at 486.  The following anecdotal exchange is very informative on this
point.  When a U.S. business man visited a big city in China, he noted that many
Chinese people (part of the city’s sanitation crew) were sweeping the streets with
old fashioned brooms.  The U.S. business man turned to his Chinese host, a gov-
ernment official, and offered to sell street sweeping machines that can clean the
streets a lot faster and better.  The government official looked at the U.S. business
man and asked: “Then, what would I do with the 10,000 people that the City has
employed as sanitation workers?”
86 Id. at 488.
87 See K. M. Sharma, From “Sanctity” to “Fairness”: An Uneasy Transition in
the Law of Contracts?, 18 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 95, 110 (1999).
88 Lee et al., supra note 18, at 624.
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tion structure the business environment.”89  The Chinese will
frequently ignore the written contract and treat it as a mere
formality.90
Chinese culture values patience and long term perspec-
tives.  The Chinese have learned to take a holistic time perspec-
tive and focus on long-term viewpoints.91  The Chinese will
spend time cultivating relationships for long term benefit.  The
“Chinese may prefer to leave timing and planning open” in con-
tract negotiations.92  Therefore, even if a contract is ultimately
signed, a signed contract means the beginning of a relationship,
not the “be all and end all” document which controls the parties’
economic relationship, as in the eyes of U.S. contract law.93
Pattison and Herron point out that “[m]any westerners make
their biggest mistake when they assume that the communica-
tion is completed when a contract is signed.”94  Because a
signed contract only represents the existence of a relationship,
the Chinese tend to treat it as changeable and renegotiable
throughout the relationship.95
Because of the Chinese cultural emphasis on reaching
agreements through cooperation and collaboration, they “will
look for the mutual benefit of both parties rather than ‘win-
ning.’”96  The strong desire to maintain harmony also means
that the Chinese are averse to conflict.97  The Chinese will go to
great lengths to avoid conflict and criticism.98  Hence, in con-
tract negotiations, the Chinese are unlikely to engage in con-
frontational negotiations.
The Chinese cultural aversion to conflict and their negative
view of law also mean that they do not expect to resort to courts
for contract enforcement.  In the United States, on the other
hand, it is the specter of litigation and the force of law that pro-
vide much of the impetus for contract enforceability.
89 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 487-88.
90 Id. at 487.
91 Id. at 488.
92 Id. at 489.
93 Id. at 491.
94 Id.
95 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 491.
96 Tanner, supra note 52, at 161.
97 Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 488.
98 Id.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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All of these differences contribute to extensive misunder-
standings when a Chinese company contracts with a U.S. com-
pany.  These misunderstandings sometimes result in disastrous
consequences for the Chinese, as shown in the above case
example.
For an American well-versed in Anglo-American thinking,
it is difficult to understand how the Chinese company in the
above case example could have signed the contract under the
circumstances.  It would appear that the Chinese company, a
relatively sophisticated company, may have knowingly assumed
the business risk and made a bad business decision.  Yet, when
put in the Chinese cultural context, the Chinese company be-
haved entirely consistently with the Chinese cultural norms.  It
is not surprising that the Chinese company signed the agree-
ment with the U.S. company, despite the inconsistencies be-
tween the written version and the oral promises.  Being
relationship oriented, the managers of the Chinese company
trusted the U.S. company and their oral promises.  The U.S.
company’s assurance that the agreement would not be enforced
is consistent with the Chinese cultural bias against law.
The Chinese company’s nonchalant attitude toward the in-
consistencies between the written contract and the verbal rep-
resentations is consistent with the Chinese view that a written
contract merely signifies the existence of a relationship.  De-
spite the fact that the agreement specified a three year term
with the right to terminate for any reason upon six month’s
written notice, the Chinese company apparently believed that
the relationship was long term.  To the Chinese, the relation-
ship was intended to be long term, because the manufacturing
facility required intensive initial capital investment and it
would not be possible to recoup the investment in three years in
a manufacturing operation.
PART II. CERTAIN EXAMPLES OF U.S. CLASSIC CONTRACT LAW
DOCTRINES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
U.S.-CHINESE CONTRACTS
This section provides a brief overview of the assumptions
behind classic contract law.  It focuses on certain examples of
U.S. contract interpretative principles or canons of construc-
tion.  This section shows how those contract principles, based on
17
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classical contract law assumptions as applied, may be unfair to
the party from a different cultural perspective.
The core value of U.S. contract law is the ideal of freedom of
contract.99  The classic contract law assumes that the parties to
a contract will exercise their free will and watch out for their
own self interests and bargain diligently on their own behalf.100
This theory assumes that the resulting written contract accu-
rately reflects the terms agreed upon as a result of the arms
length negotiations, a figurative meeting of the minds, mea-
sured by the objective manifestation of intent by both parties to
form the contract.101  Thus, it is only natural that the U.S. con-
tract law’s role is merely to enforce the written terms of the
agreement which presumably embodies the parties’ promises
and to protect the fruits of their bargaining.102
The classical contract law interpretative principles, such as
the parol evidence rule, and the U.S. courts’ general unwilling-
ness to look beyond the four corners of the contract are justified
based on those core assumptions.  Under those theories, the
Chinese company in the above case example is unlikely to re-
cover for its damages in a contract enforcement action in a U.S.
court.  The U.S. court’s singular focus on the written contract
will likely preclude any attempt by the Chinese company to in-
troduce evidence of oral representations or oral terms that are
inconsistent with the explicit terms of the agreement.  The
agreement signed by the Chinese company and the U.S. com-
pany would most likely determine the outcome under current
U.S. contract law paradigm.
Several current contract interpretation/construction princi-
ples are especially problematic in cross cultural context.  For ex-
ample, the four corners doctrine instructs a U.S. judge to stay
within the four corners of the contract when interpreting a writ-
ten contract to ascertain the intent of the parties.103  The only
way a U.S. court will look beyond the corners of the written
agreement is for a party to demonstrate that the contract terms
99 Lim, supra note 4, at 590.
100 Sharma, supra note 87, at 110.
101 Huge v. Overly, 445 F. Supp. 946, 949 (W.D. Pa. 1978); see also Caporale v.
Mar Les, Inc., 656 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1981).
102 Lim, supra note 4, at 590.
103 See, e.g., Shell Rocky Mt. Prod. v. Ultra Res., Inc., 415 F.3d 1158, 1165
(10th Cir. 2005).
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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are ambiguous.  However, U.S. courts will not necessarily con-
sider the terms of a contract to be ambiguous simply because
the parties disagree regarding the proper interpretation of the
terms.104
Another related doctrine, the plain meaning rule, requires
a U.S. court to interpret the written contract in accordance with
its plain meaning if the terms of a contract are clear and unam-
biguous.105  Again, U.S. courts focus on the written language in
a contract.  Although this rule makes sense when the core as-
sumptions hold true, the rule does not work when the written
contract does not reflect the terms of the parties’ agreement as a
result of substantive cultural differences.
The parol evidence rule is another well established contract
principle which bars introduction into evidence of any prior or
contemporaneous written or oral agreements to vary the terms
of the written contract.106  To invoke the protection of this doc-
trine, many U.S. contracts typically contain a standard merger
or integration clause that expressly states that the written con-
tract is the final expression of the parties’ intent and that it
merges all prior or contemporaneous agreements between the
parties.  The agreement prepared by the U.S. company’s in-
house counsel in the above example contained such a merger
clause.  Under the parol evidence rule, this clause will usually
bar the introduction of any oral promises prior to the formation
of the contract that contradict the “terms of the written contract
which is valid on its face.”107  Although parol evidence can be
admitted under certain circumstances (to show fraud, to supple-
ment contract terms or to explain ambiguities), the threshold
requirement for admission in a business-to-business context is
high.  This doctrine is particularly prejudicial against the non-
U.S. party in a cross cultural contractual relationship.
In light of these well established contract doctrines, a Chi-
nese company in a similar situation as the Chinese company in
the above example, may be severely prejudiced in an action to
104 Alack v. Vic Tanny Int’l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 343 (Mo. 1996).
105 See Knudsen v. Transp. Leasing/Contract, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2003).
106 See HCB Contractors v. Liberty Place Hotel Assocs., 652 A.2d 1278, 1279
(Pa. 1995).
107 Parrish v. Jackson W. Jones, P.C., 629 S.E.2d 468, 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
19
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enforce the terms of a written contract in a U.S. court.  Since
the Chinese culture considers a written contract to merely sym-
bolize the existence of a relationship, Chinese companies will
readily sign a contract without understanding its terms or they
will underestimate the significance of those terms.  That is pre-
cisely what the Chinese company in the case example did.  A
U.S court’s refusal to look beyond the four corners of the con-
tract will prevent the Chinese company from demonstrating
that the parties have agreed on terms different from those set
forth in the written contract.
Furthermore, because a written agreement drafted by a
U.S. company will generally include a merger clause, similar to
the agreement in the above case example, it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for a Chinese company to introduce
evidence of the oral promises the U.S. company made to the
Chinese company in a U.S. court.  Yet, the parties’ economic re-
lationship was based on oral promises and representations.
PART III. EXISTING CONTRACT LAW DOCTRINES ARE
INSUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS THE INEQUITIES IN CROSS
CULTURAL CONTRACT RELATIONSHIPS
U.S. contract law has evolved away from its classic para-
digm to address equitable issues primarily in consumer protec-
tion context.108  It has recognized equitable issues raised by a
modern society within the domestic context.109  Those limited
doctrines are insufficient to address the inequities raised by the
above case example.  Some scholars have pointed out that mod-
ern U.S. contract law has not gone far enough away from its
classic model because it continues to evaluate fairness issues
within the confines of the classic contract principles.110  U.S.
courts still begin their analyses of contract problems with the
108 DiMatteo, supra note 5, passim.
109 See DiMatteo, supra note 5, passim. See also Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing
Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 101 (2006).  Professor
Schmitz noted that numerous federal and state legislations have also enacted vari-
ous statutes (consumer protection, insurance, consumer lending, etc.) in an at-
tempt to counter the inequitable results from strict applications of the classic
contract law principles in various consumer contexts. Id. Those statutes are de-
signed to protect U.S. consumers and will not be able to remedy inequities in cross
cultural business to business context. Id.
110 Lim, supra note 4, at 590.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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core assumptions of freedom and autonomy of contracts.111  As a
result, modern contract law continues to limit its engagement
with social-fairness issues.112  The focus is on the language in
the written agreement.113  As explained below, these contract
principles based on equitable considerations cannot adequately
remedy the inequity present in cross cultural contracts.
Recognizing the harsh results of applying classic contract
principles in certain situations, U.S. courts have sometimes re-
sorted to the use of the doctrine of fraud or misrepresentation to
void certain contract terms.114  Courts have typically invoked
the doctrine of fraud or misrepresentation in a situation which
involves outright fraud or misrepresentation and where it
would be patently unfair to enforce the contract as written.
This doctrine is rarely invoked in business-to-business context
with sophisticated businesses that regularly engage in these
types of economic transactions.115
The Chinese company in the case example is therefore un-
likely to win a claim based on fraud or misrepresentation re-
lated to the negotiations prior to the signing of the written
agreement.  Based on the current U.S. contract law paradigm,
the Chinese company should have protected its own interest by
bargaining zealously on its own behalf.  The Chinese company
certainly had the financial resources to hire an attorney to as-
sist with contract negotiations.  The Chinese company could
have informed itself better.116  Hence, there was no inequality
111 See, e.g., Freightliner of Knoxville, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Vans, LLC, 484
F.3d 865, 870 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on the parol evidence rule and the merger
clauses in the written agreement and rejecting plaintiff’s claims based on extrinsic
representations); see also Whitebox Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v. IVAX
Corp., 482 F.3d 1018, 1021 (8th Cir. 2007) (dismissing a breach of contract claim
by relying on the plain meaning rule under New York law).
112 Lim, supra note 4, at 582.
113 See supra notes 104-08.
114 Cordry v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., 445 F.3d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 2007)
(stating that “[p]arties are generally free to contract as they wish, and courts will
enforce contracts according to their plain meaning, unless induced by fraud, du-
ress, or undue influence.” (quoting Util. Serv. & Maint., Inc. v. Noranda Alumi-
num, Inc., 163 S.W.3d 910, 913 (Mo. 2005))).
115 See, e.g., Format Corp. v. Widewaters Prop. Dev. Corp., 162 F. App’x 168,
170 (3rd Cir. 2006).
116 I agree wholeheartedly with the notion that Chinese companies should
learn not to sign written agreements without understanding their significance or
seeking sound legal advice.  But the reality is that this has happened and will
happen and U.S. contract law is stacked against the Chinese companies and other
21
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in bargaining positions from the financial perspective.  A U.S.
judge steeped in the classical contract law tradition would see
no reason to rescue a Chinese company which seemingly had
assumed the business risk of entering into this contract.  This
classic contract mentality, however, ignores the cultural dy-
namics of the relationship between the Chinese company and
the U.S. company.  The doctrine of fraud/misrepresentation is
therefore unlikely to remedy the inequities in the cross cultural
context.
The unconscionability doctrine is another doctrine associ-
ated with U.S. contract law’s attempt to address fairness con-
cerns.117  Under this doctrine, a party who wishes to avoid
enforcement of a contract generally must show that the agree-
ment is both substantively and procedurally unconscionable.
“Procedural unconscionability focuses on whether the bargain-
ing process . . . was adhesive or unduly one-sided, whereas sub-
stantive unconscionability focuses on whether the contract
terms are unduly oppressive or otherwise unfair.”118  “Most
[U.S.] courts . . . require that the conditions of unconscionability
exist at the time the contract was made.”119  Therefore, the un-
conscionability doctrine does not apply when the unfair circum-
stances did not exist at the time the contract was entered into.
U.S. courts have applied the unconscionability test in a
rigid fashion.120  The unconscionability test is very difficult to
satisfy in a business-to-business context.121  U.S. courts have
only found an agreement unconscionable where it offended no-
tions of “decency,” or had grossly unfair results – all viewed in
the context of the dominant western cultural values.122  The
doctrine of unconscionability is further limited because it is only
available as a defense to contract enforcement, and not as a
parties from different cultural backgrounds.  The question this paper seeks to ad-
dress is what steps the United States can undertake from a contract law perspec-
tive to level the playing field.
117 Schmitz, supra note 109, at 74 (discussing in depth the development of the
unconscionability doctrine).
118 Id. at 75.
119 Kim, supra note 7, at 553.
120 Schmitz, supra note 109, at 75.
121 Kim, supra note 7, at 551-52.
122 Id.
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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source of affirmative relief.123  Thus, it cannot be used as a
mechanism for seeking damages in a U.S. court.
Because U.S. courts have sought to address fairness issues
within the confines of the U.S. classic contract paradigm, the
unconscionability doctrine cannot adequately address fairness
concerns in cross cultural business to business context.  It is un-
likely that a U.S. judge will consider the agreement in the above
case example between two businesses rise to the level of
unconscionability.
Furthermore, because the unconscionability doctrine can-
not be used as a vehicle to recover damages, it will not remedy
the inequities where the other party has suffered damages.  In
the above case example, the Chinese company was unable to
reap the benefits of its extensive investment in manufacturing
equipment and facilities because of the U.S. company’s early
termination of the contract.  The Chinese company suffered
heavy financial losses and ultimately had to shut down its oper-
ations because of the losses it suffered.  The Chinese company
would be more interested in seeking damages for the U.S. com-
pany’s breach of the agreement instead of attempting to avoid
its enforcement.
Another example of an equitable doctrine which may pro-
vide some limited relief in certain situations is the doctrine of
promissory estoppel.
In order to recover under a promissory estoppel theory . . . a plain-
tiff must show: 1) a clear and unambiguous promise; 2) reasona-
ble and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is
made; and 3) an injury sustained by the party asserting the estop-
pel by reason of his reliance.124
However, even if a plaintiff is able to establish promissory es-
toppel, courts have restricted the application of the theory to a
limited class of cases in which “the circumstances are such as to
render it unconscionable” to refuse to enforce the promise upon
which the promisee has relied.125
123 Lim, supra note 4, at 607; Kim, supra note 7, at 552.
124 Tri-County Motors, Inc. v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 161,
173 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Sys. Dev., Inc., 47 F.3d 39, 44
(2d Cir. 1995).
125 Philo Smith & Co., Inc. v. USLIFE Corp., 554 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1977); see
Lynch v. Sease, 2007 F. App’x 0297N (6th Cir. 2007).
23
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By definition, a promise is a representation as to future in-
tent, not a past or present fact.126  Promissory estoppel comes
into play in situations where actual consideration is not pre-
sent.  It generally does not apply in situations where a contract
exists since a necessary element of a valid contract is considera-
tion.127  Therefore, if a valid, enforceable contract exists be-
tween the parties as to a certain issue, their rights and
obligations are governed solely by the contract terms.128
In the above case example, the Chinese company signed a
written contract with the U.S. company.  The promissory estop-
pel doctrine would most likely not apply.  In addition, the doc-
trine requires that the Chinese company “reasonably” relied on
the promises.  Without proper cultural context, the Chinese
company’s reliance on oral promises despite written terms of
the contract to the contrary would most likely be viewed as un-
reasonable from a U.S. contract law perspective.  Hence, the
promissory estoppel doctrine would not be able to help the Chi-
nese company in the case example.
Furthermore, even if the Chinese company could success-
fully assert the promissory estoppel doctrine, it would have only
allowed the Chinese company to recover damages suffered in
reasonable reliance of the oral promises made by the U.S. com-
pany.  Those damages would most likely include only the
amount of money that the Chinese company invested in its
manufacturing equipment in reasonable reliance on the long
term relationship promise.  Therefore, even if the Chinese com-
pany could successfully invoke the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel, it would not be able to recover any damages in the form of
expected profits.
126 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 55 (2008) (noting that promissory
estoppel is “predicated on promises or assurances as to future conduct”); see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981).
127 White v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1212, 1217 (D.S.C.
1992).
128 See Charleston County Sch. Dist. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 348 S.C. 420, 559
S.E.2d 362, 364 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (dismissing promissory estoppel counterclaim
because counterplaintiff admitted a contract that specifically governed the issue);
see also Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., Inc., 386 F.3d 581,
599 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n South Carolina, equitable relief is precluded under a the-
ory of promissory estoppel if the estoppel claim is in direct conflict with a specific
contract term.”).
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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Another U.S. contract principle which can provide some
limited relief is the doctrine of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.129  U.S. courts generally hold that every
contract contains an implied promise of good faith and fair deal-
ing between the contracting parties.130  The covenant requires a
party vested with broad discretion to act reasonably and not ar-
bitrarily or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties.  U.S. courts generally use the covenant to
determine the intent of the parties where a contract is suscepti-
ble to two conflicting constructions.  A U.S. court is unlikely to
rely on an implied covenant of good faith to overrule or modify
the express terms of a contract in a business-to-business
context.131
It is unlikely that this doctrine could help the Chinese com-
pany in the case example.  This doctrine, as it is currently for-
mulated and applied, cannot be used to contradict the express
terms of a written contract.  A U.S. court would most likely de-
fer to the agreement between the two parties in this case.
PART IV. GLOBALIZATION AND THE NEED FOR U.S.
CONTRACT LAW TO ADAPT
The central theme of this paper readily begs the following
questions: Why is there any need for the United States to adapt
its domestic contract law theory to accommodate different cul-
tures globally?  Why can’t Chinese companies hire competent
U.S. trained attorneys if they want to do business with U.S.
companies?  For example, the Chinese company in the above
case example can certainly afford to hire competent lawyers.  In
any event, why don’t Chinese companies (or companies around
the globe) learn how to do business the American way?
This paper argues that globalization renders it necessary
for U.S. contract law to adapt.  The Global Village132 phenome-
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 205 (1981).
130 See e.g., Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc. v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 395
(7th Cir. 2004).
131 Id.
132 Old Messengers, New Media, The Legacy of Innes and McLuhan: McLuhan,
The Global Village, http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/innis-mcluhan/002033-
2060-e.html (last visited October 13, 2008).  Herbert Marshall McLuhan coined
this term in the 1960s.  McLuhan  (July 21, 1911 – Dec. 31, 1980) was a Canadian
educator, philosopher, and scholar.  I am borrowing the concept of Global Village
25
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non has brought to the forefront the need for this adaptation.133
The “flattening” of the world has brought global companies to-
gether.134  The Internet and other modern technology has re-
duced the significance of physical geographical boundaries.  An
increasing number of companies from different countries have
begun doing business with U.S. companies.  China is only one of
the many with substantially different cultures.  It is undeniable
that increased interaction results in increased interdepend-
ency.135
Professor Overby has sagely pointed out the “potential
clash between the local and the global that will call into ques-
tion the current state of American contract law and undercut
Western universalist tendencies in the upcoming years.”136
Scholars from across the disciplines have recognized that
globalization presents a challenge to “black box theories” which
treat nation states, geographically bounded societies, or legal
systems as discrete entities.137  While some legal principles may
here to refer to the fact that internet, ease of transportation and other technologi-
cal advances have shortened the geographical distances and eliminated the physi-
cal borders of countries.  As a result, the world has figuratively shrunk into a small
village.
133 Overby, supra note 2, at 606; see David S. Law, Globalization and the Fu-
ture of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1277, 1289 (2008).
134 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2005); Pattison & Herron, supra note 16, at 477 (noting that “[w]ith the advent of a
truly globalized world, it is not only markets but entire cultures that are coming
into contact.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
135 The interaction between the local and the global has been attracting exten-
sive contemporary social science research.  Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Hal-
liday, Law Between the Global and the Local: Negotiating Globalization: Global
Scripts and Intermediation in the Construction of Asian Insolvency Regimes, 31
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 521, 522 (2006).  Carruthers & Halliday point out that there
has been extensive interdisciplinary scholarship on law and globalization in the
areas of voting rights, immigration, women’s rights, environmental policies, and
citizenship. Id.  However, questions of whether or the extent to which the local law
should adapt to the global in the commercial law context in light of globalization
has been under researched. Id. at 523.
136 Overby, supra note 2, at 606.
137 WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION & LEGAL THEORY 9 (Butterworths 2000);
see also TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES
327 (Michael Likosky, ed., Butterworths 2002) (wherein Professor Koh pointed out
the need to study transnational legal process: “the theory and practice of how pub-
lic and private actors . . . interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and
international fora to make, interpret, enforce and ultimately, INTERNALISE rules of
transnational law.”); Fabio Morosini, Globalization & Law:  Beyond Traditional
Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies and an Example From Private Interna-
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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have arguably served their function “in a world of relatively im-
permeable borders and immobile factors of production,” they
may not function so well “in a world of relatively porous borders
and relentless mobility.”138  U.S. contract law is a classic exam-
ple of such “black box theories.”  The globalization phenomenon
has presented a set of different challenges or exacerbated ex-
isting challenges to U.S. contract law.
U.S. contract law has been widely criticized for its flawed
assumptions.139  Numerous legal scholars have criticized U.S.
contract law for having assumptions that are rooted in the clas-
sic contract law model and detached from the reality of human
behavior in the domestic context.140  Professor Ian McNeil has
long recognized the complex relational nature of contractual re-
lationships and devoted a career to developing his relational
contract theory.  He has argued that “effective analysis of any
transaction requires recognition and consideration of all essen-
tial elements of its enveloping relations that might affect the
transaction significantly.”141  Professor Eisenberg has pointed
out that contract law should be “more individualized rather
than standardized, subjective rather than objective, complex
rather than binary, and dynamic rather than static.”142
tional Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 542 (2005) (pointing out that “if
individuals and businesses continue to delocalize at an increasing rate, nations
must develop mechanisms and provide new tools to understand foreign individu-
als, systems, and institutions.”).
138 Law, supra note 133, at 1288.
139 Sharma, supra note 87, at 116 (commenting that “academic criticism of con-
tract law has been harsh, with one leading critic labeling it “dead” and another
calling contract theory “a mess.”) (internal citations omitted).
140 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1069-70; Lim, supra note 4, at 592; Ei-
senberg, supra note 4, at 808-11; Morant, supra note 4, at 897.
141 Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 877, 881 (2000).
142 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2000).  Professor Eisenberg posits that the classic contract law
has been largely overthrown. Id. at 1813.  However, other scholars have pointed
out that although courts have rejected application of classical contract principles
in certain instances, much of the U.S. modern contract law continues to be driven
by the classic contract premise of the freedom of contract.  Lim, supra note 4, at
590.  Whether or not the modern contract law has evolved to the point at which one
can conclude that the classic contract law reasoning and rules have been over-
thrown is beyond the scope of this paper.  As discussed later in this article, certain
modern contract law principles which are intended to remedy the harshness of the
classic contract law approach cannot remedy the inequities in the cross cultural
business-to-business context with which this article is concerned.
27
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Following the dynamic reasoning of Professor Eisenberg,
Professor Kim has argued that “rapid societal changes require a
theory of contract that is capable of evolving with them.”143  In
her article, Evolving Business and Social Norms and Interpreta-
tion Rules: the Need for a Dynamic Approach to Contract Dis-
putes, she pointed out that “[c]ultural and linguistic differences
abound in international transactions as well as in transactions
between and among residents of the United States.”144  Profes-
sor Kim examined in depth the fairness of applying U.S. classic
contract law principles to cross cultural contracts in the context
involving cross border and domestic consumer transactions.
She argued that application of U.S. contract interpretation
rules undermines U.S. contract law objectives and advocated for
a dynamic contract approach which focuses on ascertaining the
true intent of the parties.145  Professor McConnaughay has also
noted the fundamental differences in the role of law between
the East and the West.146  He urged a rethinking of the role of
law and contracts in East-West commercial relationships.147
In view of the changing global landscape and acknowledged
flawed assumptions in U.S. contract law, what are the conse-
quences of U.S. contract law’s failure to adapt?  One can argue
that the legitimacy and relevancy of U.S. contract law is at
stake.  For U.S. contract law principles to be legitimate in the
global business community, they need to take into consideration
the cultural differences of the parties from other countries.148
Professor Thomas Franck has argued that, to be legitimate,
governmental acts depend on the consent of the governed.149
Therefore, a “government must ascertain the opinions and
desires of the people, including outsiders, before designing and
enforcing government actions.”150  Some international scholars
143 Kim, supra note 7, at 507.
144 Id. at 537.
145 Id. at 528-30.
146 McConnaughay, supra note 7, at 478-79.
147 Id.
148 Even within the domestic context, the United States has become a pluralis-
tic society which mirrors the global community. See Lim, supra note 4, at 586-87.
149 Thomas Franck, The Emerging Rights to Democratic Governance, 86 AM J.
INT’L L. 46, 48 (1992).
150 Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Building Bridges IV: Of Cultures, Col-
ors, and Clashes - Capturing the International in Delgado’s Chronicles, 4 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 115, 150 (2000).
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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have pointed out that “domestic law must be reviewed to re-
main in step with best practices.”151 Contract law principles
that clearly favor domestic parties cannot be legitimate in the
international business community.
There is anecdotal evidence that numerous Chinese compa-
nies are now insisting on alternative dispute resolution clauses
in their contracts with U.S. companies instead of submitting
themselves to the U.S. law.152  If the U.S. contract law persists
in “my way or the highway,” it will risk becoming irrelevant in
the global community.153
Furthermore, U.S. contract law, with its Anglo-American
bias, can potentially interfere with the economic development of
the United States.  Scholarly research has shown that investors
are sensitive to legal differences and prefer countries which
have favorable laws to them.154  Investors with highly mobile
capital can move around the globe and select jurisdictions
friendly to them.155  Some studies also suggest that the “quality
and characteristics of a country’s legal infrastructure . . . affect
its prospects for economic prosperity.”156  The Chinese govern-
ment has been encouraging Chinese companies to go global.157
There is anecdotal evidence that Chinese companies are hesi-
tating to invest in the United States because they consider the
legal environment of the United States unfriendly.
151 Bruno Zeller, The Parol Evidence Rule and the CISG - A Comparative Anal-
ysis, 36 COMP. L.J. S. AFR.  (2003), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/
biblio/zeller6.html.
152 Sharma, supra note 87, at 130.  However, it is not clear if alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanism provides a more appropriate forum for cross border
commercial business-to-business disputes between people from drastically differ-
ent cultures. Compare Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 150, at 147. Some scholars
have suggested that informal alternative dispute resolution mechanisms disad-
vantage subordinate groups, notwithstanding arguments that the alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanism’s lower costs and relaxed venues have a leveling effect
on power differentials. Id.
153 Morosini, supra note 137, at 552.
154 Carruthers & Halliday, supra note 135, at 524.
155 Id.
156 Law, supra note 133, at 1287 n. 33.
157 IBM Institute for Business Value, Going Global: Prospects and Challenges
for Chinese Companies on the World Stage, IBM BUS. CONSULTING SERVS. (IBM
Global Servs., Somers, N.Y.), Mar. 2006, at 5, available at http://www-935.ibm.
com/services/us/imc/pdf/g510-6269-going-global.pdf.
29
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In addition, as pointed out by Professor Kim and some
other scholars, U.S. contract law is unfair to people with differ-
ent cultural values, because this can perpetuate the existing in-
equities between the U.S. companies and companies from other
countries with different cultures.158  Armed with its team of
U.S. trained lawyers, a U.S. company will be at a clear advan-
tage when entering into a contract with a Chinese company, as
demonstrated by the case example.  This problem is exacer-
bated by the high, sometimes prohibitive, costs to hire equiva-
lently trained and experienced U.S. lawyers.159
One may arguably justify maintaining the fiction of “free-
dom of contract or individual autonomy” perpetuated by U.S.
contract law in domestic contexts for the sake of stability, reli-
ance and predictability.160  As Professor Kim pointed out, at-
tempting to maintain such a fiction in cross cultural contexts
would perpetuate the “status quo in favor of those with more
resources or greater bargaining power.”161  U.S. contract law le-
gitimizes the inequity by maintaining this fiction.162  U.S. con-
tract law should not avoid its responsibility for fairness either
domestically or globally.163
In addition to being unfair, the current U.S. contract law’s
focus on the written contract also undermines U.S. contract
law’s ultimate goal to ascertain the intent of the parties to the
contract.  As Professor Kim pointed out, certain “[f]ormalistic
evidentiary rules, such as the parol evidence rule and the four
corners rule,” can be easily manipulated by the party who has
better access to lawyers and more resources.164  The resulting
written agreement is sometimes more of an attempt to manipu-
158 Kim, supra note 7, at 530; Lim, supra note 4, at 603.
159 Keith Maurer, The Truth About Arbitration: Enforcing Consumers’ and
Employees’ Legal Rights, 82 MICH. BUS. L.J. 20, 21 (May 2003) (pointing out an
American Bar Association report that “100 million Americans are effectively
barred from seeking justice by the high cost of lawyers and the lawsuit system.”),
available at http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article564.pdf.
160 Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 808; Lim, supra note 4, at 591.
161 Kim, supra note 7, at 530.
162 Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally:  The Incoherence of
Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political
Economy, 69 UMKC L. REV. 733, 743-45 (2001).
163 See Schmitz, supra note 109, at 74; Lim, supra note 4, at 619.
164 Kim, supra note 7, at 567.
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 22 Side A      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 22 Side A      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR101.txt unknown Seq: 31  6-APR-09 12:15
2009] A GLOBAL CHALLENGE TO U.S. CONTRACT LAW 31
late the predictable contract rules as opposed to a reflection of
the parties’ true intent.
One may also question the assumption that the Chinese (or
peoples from other different cultures) will “learn how to do busi-
ness the American way.”  Some scholars have questioned the
feasibility or the desirability of “complete westernization of all
international commercial practices.”165 Professor McCon-
naughay points out that the “Western legal traditions and val-
ues” have not been adopted wholesale by Asian societies.166
Japan, for example, has had “over one hundred years of experi-
ence with Western civil law,” but traditional cultural values
“continue to play a significant role in shaping Japanese behav-
ior” in commercial relationships.167  China has had only two de-
cades of experience trying to set up a functioning legal system.
Although China has adopted extensive legislation with some le-
gal concepts borrowed from the western civil law and common
law traditions, it is an entirely open question whether those
transplanted concepts are compatible with the Chinese cultural
values, let alone whether they can supplant deep rooted cul-
tural values.  Moreover, there is also the question of the desira-
bility of transplanting legal concepts.168
Some may argue that the U.S. contract law paradigm seeks
to promote transactional autonomy.169  This position assumes
that transactional autonomy is necessary to promote healthy
economic growth.  Some scholars have questioned that assump-
tion.170  Professor LaKritz has pointed out that “nothing sug-
gests that market equality and transactional autonomy vis-a`-
vis government institutions are more valuable than more tradi-
tional Chinese transactional norms.”171  Professor Donald
Clarke has also questioned whether “a legal order offering sta-
ble and predictable rights of property and contract [characteris-
tics] . . . of the legal systems of the developed countries of the
West” (what he refers to as the Rights Hypothesis) is necessa-
165 McConnaughay, supra note 7, at 429-31.
166 Id.
167 Id. at p. 431 nn. 19-22.
168 One can argue that the numerous problems that the Chinese legal system
have with implementation and enforceability are symptoms of incompatibility.
169 See Sharma, supra note 87, at 109-10.
170 LaKritz, supra note 23, at 240, 265.
171 Id.
31
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rily required to achieve significant economic growth or the only
mechanism to provide effective enforcement of contract
rights.172
Finally, the U.S. government and academic communities
have long criticized China’s human rights record.  China has
been urged to adopt rules which reflect the Anglo-American val-
ues such as freedom of the press and separation of powers.
Clearly, the United States is urging China to adapt China’s do-
mestic laws to western values.173  There has also been extensive
discussion about a “ ‘Rule of Law Initiative’ to help China reform
its laws and legal institutions.”174  Therefore, to be morally con-
sistent, the United States should be willing to adapt its own do-
mestic laws to address the concerns from other cultures in this
increasingly global environment.
PART V. TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE U.S. CONTRACT LAW
FOR CROSS CULTURAL CONTRACTS
How should U.S. contract law acknowledge the impact of
cultural differences on contracting behavior?  This is a difficult
question without an easy answer.175
172 Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The
China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 91-92, 110-11 (2003); see LaKritz, supra
note 23, at 265.
173 This comparison is not intended to criticize the worldwide efforts to urge
China to improve its human rights record.  Rather, it is meant to support the need
for critical self examination of domestic laws to nurture a more harmonious global
environment for all countries which share this planet with us.
174 Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? Problems
and Prospects of U.S. Sponsored Rule of Law Reform Projects in the People’s Re-
public of China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 66-70 (2000).
175 This paper focuses on the adaptation of U.S. domestic contract law to ac-
knowledge cultural differences.  One question is whether this issue should be re-
solved at the global level.  At the global level, there has been extensive activity and
academic debates about the desirability and feasibility of harmonizing contract
law.  In 1980, the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of
Goods (“CISG”) was adopted in a diplomatic conference organized by United Na-
tions Commission for International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”). See generally Ole
Lando, CISG and its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt Some International Principles
of Contract Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 380 (2005).  The CISG only applies to a
subset of cross cultural contracts. Id.  Nonetheless, it represented the first step.
Id. Whether or not the CISG rules equitably address issues related to cross cul-
tural contracts or whether the U.S. courts are applying CISG equitably is beyond
the scope of this paper.  In 2004, the Governing Council of UNIDROIT adopted the
new edition of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.
Id. at 381.  Some of the topics for the UNICTRAL 2007 Congress, held in July
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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Recognizing the social changes brought on by increased
cross border transactions and the use of standard form agree-
ments,176  Professor Kim proposed, among others, that the
traditional formalistic contract  principles “such as the parol ev-
idence rule and the four corners rule” be abandoned.177  She ar-
gued that these rules “ignore the significance of preexisting
relationships and nonverbal communication and wrongly as-
sume linguistic certainty.”178  Under Professor Kim’s “dynamic
approach,” the focus is on ascertaining the true intent of the
parties.179  Professor Kim suggested that contracting parties be
allowed to present evidence of prior negotiations and the sur-
rounding circumstances to prove the true intent of the
parties.180
This paper proposes a differentiated approach toward cross
cultural contracts.  U.S. contract law should treat cross cultural
contracts as a separate category of contracts.  Although it may
be highly desirable and convenient to have one set of contract
law principles to apply universally to all contracts, universality
may need to be compromised where “universality is inconsistent
with sophistication and realism.”181 As Professors Korobkin and
Ulen suggest, “legal policymakers are better off foregoing
universality and, instead, creating a collection of situation-spe-
2007, dealt with The Future of Contract Law Harmonization; Uniform Contract
Law in Practice; Carriage of Goods in the 21st Century; Electronic Commerce: Be-
yond Functional Equivalence.  Some scholars have raised the issue of creating a
Global Commercial Code.  Michael Joachim Bonell, 10th Biennial Conference of the
International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law: Creating International
Legislation for the Twenty-First Century: Do We Need a Global Commercial Code?
106 DICK. L. REV. 87 (2001). See also Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil
Law Paradigm for a Future International Commercial Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 677,
734-53 (2005) (discussing the international efforts on contract law).  It is beyond
the scope of this paper to examine the pros and cons of global harmonization of
contract law and whether there exists a set of international contract principles
which accommodate different cultural values.  In any event, global practices do not
absolve the United States of fashioning a more equitable approach domestically.
176 Kim, supra note 7, at 507-08, 565-68 (providing in detail a set of guidelines
for a dynamic approach to contract interpretation).
177 Id. at 567.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1073.
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cific minitheories useful in the analysis of discrete legal
problems.”182
This culturally differentiated contract approach consists of
two steps.  First, U.S. courts should allow parties to proffer evi-
dence of cultural differences to demonstrate the existence of cul-
tural differences.  Scholars have “urged the adoption of a . . .
cultural defense” — the use of evidence of minority cultures —
in the criminal law context for the “twin goals of cultural plural-
ism and individualized justice.”183  Some U.S. courts have al-
lowed criminal defendants to assert culture as a defense,
although the results for criminal defendants in general have va-
ried greatly.184  In the contract law context, instead of mitigat-
ing, excusing or justifying a crime, cultural evidence would be
used as a sword to pierce the magic shield the current U.S. con-
tract law has cast over a written contract.
Once a party demonstrates the existence of cultural differ-
ences, then the traditional contract interpretation and construc-
tion doctrines would not apply.185  The party would be
permitted to introduce evidence of all relevant negotiations in
order to ascertain the true intent of the parties. Numerous
scholars have proposed that the parol evidence rule be aban-
doned because it has outlived its reason for existence.186
This two phased approach would allow U.S. courts to con-
sider cultural differences when those cultural differences have
impacted the parties’ contracting behavior.  It would serve U.S.
contract law’s ultimate goal of ascertaining the parties’ intent
182 Id.
183 Elaine M. Chiu, Culture as Justification, Not Excuse, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1317, 1320 (2006) (providing a detailed discussion about the use of evidence of
minority cultures in the criminal law context).
184 Id. at 1321.
185 A CISG advisory opinion states that the Parol Evidence Rule and the Plain
Meaning Rule do not apply to contracts under the CISG.  CISG-AC Opinion No. 3,
Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual Merger Clause and the
CISG, October 23, 2004. Rapporteur: Professor Richard Hyland, Rutgers Law
School, Camden, N.J. U.S.A.  On its face, it appears that the CISG would allow
consideration of cultural differences in contracting behavior in a subset of con-
tracts involving cross border transactions.  Can the CISG effectively address the
Chinese challenge?  This topic is beyond the scope of this article.
186 For a more lengthy discussion of the parol evidence rule and why it should
be abandoned, see generally Paolo Torzilli, The Aftermath of MCC-Marble: Is This
the Death Knell for the Parol Evidence Rule?, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 843 (2000)
(discussing the parol evidence rule and providing reasons for abandoning it).
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
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more faithfully than the current approach, which favors a party
who shares the Anglo American values and who is well
equipped to manipulate contract law principles to the detriment
of parties from other cultures.
This differentiated approach has precedent in the existing
U.S. contract law framework.  For example, with the advent
and increased use of form agreements, U.S. courts have adapted
by adopting the “contract of adhesion” concept and developing
special rules in addressing those “contracts of adhesion.”187  Un-
like the dynamic approach of Professor Kim, a differentiated ap-
proach toward cross cultural contracts leaves the existing U.S.
contract law framework intact.  It affects only the subsets of the
written contracts where cultural differences matter.
Admittedly, this differentiated approach would allow evi-
dentiary proof to show that the parties intended to reach terms
different from those in the written agreement.  This can reduce
the predictability in a U.S. court, one of the factors always cited
in support of the classic contract interpretative principles.
However, predictability in the case of cross cultural contracts
comes at the expense of fairness.  Perhaps, a better balance is to
reduce predictability to a limited extent for the sake of fairness.
As the above case example demonstrates, the predictability
sustained by U.S. contract law was easily manipulated by a le-
gally sophisticated U.S. company at the expense of the Chinese
party.  If U.S. contract law refuses to take into consideration
cultural values and their impact on contracting behavior in
cross cultural contexts, the only predictable result is that the
party from another culture will get the short end of the stick
where U.S. contract law is concerned.  This conflicts with the
fundamental notion of fairness.  It is time for U.S. contract law
to search for a proper balance between predictability and fair-
ness that includes peoples from other cultures.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, globalization has brought many changes and
challenges.  Different peoples and remote cultures have come
187 J.W. Looney & Anita K. Poole, Adhesion Contracts, Bad Faith, and Eco-
nomically Faulty Contracts, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 177 (1999) (tracing the develop-
ment and history of adhesion contracts doctrine).
35
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 24 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 24 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR101.txt unknown Seq: 36  6-APR-09 12:15
36 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:1
closely together in an unprecedented manner.  As a result, we
have become more interdependent.  The interdependence re-
quires more vigilance in formulating domestic rules and princi-
ples that are equitable across cultures and/or borders.
U.S. contract law in its current form is inadequate in the
age of globalization.  Its underlying assumptions reflect the val-
ues of an Anglo American society.  It does not apply to other
cultures with different values and priorities.  Therefore, apply-
ing U.S. contract law to cross cultural contracts can be unfair
and may undermine the U.S. contract law’s ultimate goal of en-
forcing the intent of the contractual parties.  A differentiated
contract law approach that considers substantial cultural differ-
ences may be able to remedy the unfairness without threaten-
ing the entire framework of U.S. contract law.
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/1
